The Big Idea
Wars Update: Holiday Edition
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I will out over the next week, so I thought I would empty my notebook and publish a Holiday Edition Wars Update before I go.
Not surprisingly, the vacuum created by the overthrow of the Assad regime is bringing sectarian strife. Video was posted of an Alawite shrine in Aleppo being set on fire. This incident reportedly occurred weeks ago, just before Assad was deposed. In any case, forces loyal to Assad ambushed police members and civilians in Tartus, the heart of pro-Assad Alawite territory (and home to the Russian naval base). It will be very difficult to hold Syria together in the absence of a strong dictator, as the ethnic and religious mix is quite varied, similar to Lebanon.
Just to underscore a point that I have previously explored, the new Syrian leadership’s antipathy toward Iran, Lebanese media reported last week that the new government is preparing to demand that Iran pay $300 billion in reparations to Syria for its “criminal and arbitrary policies.”
Israel appears to have turned its sites fully to the Houthis in Yemen. The Houthis have fired 4 missiles into Israel within a week. Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered attacks on the coastline and in Sanaa again on December 26, after a prior wave of strikes caused minimal damage. Netanyahu also vowed to “hunt down” all of the Houthi leaders, which would be a repeat of the campaign Israel conducted against Hezbollah in the fall.
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov rejected the contours of a ceasefire agreement suggested by the Trump camp. He said that Russia is willing to negotiate but only for a final deal that secures Russian security, which is to say, as I have been emphasizing, that Russia will not be satisfied with anything short of a full surrender from Ukraine and the stripping of Ukraine’s sovereignty.
An updated evaluation of satellite imagery of Russian military depots by one expert concluded that Russia still has 47% of its pre-war tank reserves, 52% of pre-war infantry fighting vehicles, and 45% of pre-war armored personnel carriers. However, these images indicate that Russia has exhausted its modern T-90 stock and most of its T-80 tanks. It still has most of its Soviet-era T-72, T-62/64, and T-54/55 tanks in storage, but the bulk of them have been sitting out in the open air for decades and are unlikely to be of much use (a lot of the older tanks have already been raided for parts to repair tanks already in the field). These estimates are, of course, subject to a high degree of uncertainty (for example, Russia may have additional reserves in indoor storage depots that would not be visible in satellite images). In any case, along several portions of the front, Russian attacks have included fewer and fewer mechanized armored vehicles, which would seem to be a sure sign that Russia is indeed running short of tanks and other armored vehicles. The Ukrainian estimate of cumulative Russian losses amounted to over 420,000 casualties in 2024, more than in 2022 and 2023 combined. Lost tanks are nearing 10K, armored fighting vehicles losses exceed 20K, and artillery systems exceed 21K.
Ukrainian President Zelenskyy asserted on December 23 that 3,000 North Korean troops had been killed or wounded in the Kursk region, which would be a quarter of the reported 12,000 troops sent. South Korean intelligence reports that North Korea is preparing to send more men and equipment. Ukrainian sources estimate that 60% of artillery shells and almost one-third of ballistic missiles used by Russia in Ukraine are supplied by North Korea. In return, Russia is paying North Korea cash and oil as well as advanced military equipment such as air defense systems and jet fighters.
Ukraine attacked the headquarters facility of a Russian marine brigade in the Kursk region, reportedly killing a large number of officers including the Deputy Commander of the brigade. Ukraine also struck a Russian ammo depot and a defense industrial plant in the Rostov region. These sorts of strikes over the past few months have reportedly starved Russian frontline units in some areas of weapons and ammunition.
On the ground in Ukraine, Russia continues to struggle in the northern half of the front but have had more success further south. In Siversk, Chasiv Yar, and Toretsk, Ukraine has managed counterattacks and the frontlines haven’t changed much. In contrast, Russia is moving further west just to the south of Povrovsk, threatening to eventually cut off supply lines and bypass a head-on attack against the town’s prepared defenses. Russia has also pretty much taken control of Kurakhove, though Ukrainian troops continue to inflict heavy casualties during their fighting retreat. Russian forces are also closing in on the village of Velyka Novosilka.
An Azerbaijan Airlines plane crashed in Kazakhstan on Christmas Day, leading to at least 38 deaths. The plane was bound for Grozny, in Russia’s Chechnya region. The official Russian explanation was a bird strike, but Ukraine and most independent experts argued that Russia shot down the plane with its air defenses, perhaps mistaking it for Ukrainian drones. The Kazakh government will conduct an investigation. President Putin apologized to the Azeri leader for the “tragic incident”, but he did not take responsibility. Russia has in recent years had been relatively friendly with Azerbaijan, but relations soured last year when Azerbaijan launched a military offensive into Nagorno-Karabakh, and this plane incident may drive Azerbaijan further away from Russia’s orbit and closer to Turkey, which is suddenly gaining substantial influence in the region, largely at the expense of Russia (see also Syria).
Also on Christmas Day, Russia launched another large airstrike on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. 78 missiles and 106 drones were sent, of which 19 missiles penetrated Ukrainian air defenses, causing damage and forcing Ukraine’s grid operator to enforce rolling blackouts in parts of the country to manage the system.
A Russian oil tanker, part of the “shadow fleet” that is used by Russia to circumvent sanctions, apparently severed undersea power and data cables in the Baltic Sea that were servicing Finland. This is the latest in a series of similar actions by ships tied to Russia, a part of Russia’s efforts to undermine Europe, which is supporting Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself against the Russian invasion. The Finnish authorities seized the tanker, and there are reports that the ship was loaded with communications equipment and was also being used to spy on NATO/European communications (in addition to severing key undersea cables). I would expect that European officials will need to ratchet up their response to what has become a pattern of sabotage by Russian vessels or ships with Russian operatives on board.
A U.S. company delivered a first shipment of liquified natural gas (LNG) to Ukraine last week under a broader agreement that extends through 2026. Meanwhile, the current contract between Russia and Ukraine for transporting Russian natural gas via pipelines through Ukraine to Europe expires at the end of 2024, and it is unclear whether the contract will be renewed, though Ukraine is signaling that it will not allow continued Russian gas exports through its country. A halt to these exports could create disruption of energy supplies across Eastern Europe.
Russia might need to keep an eye on its eastern flank. A social media video is going viral in China calling for the Chinese to take advantage of Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine and seize large pieces of Russian territory in Asia.
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