By the Numbers
A private-label MBS buyer’s guide for 2025
Chris Helwig | December 13, 2024
This document is intended for institutional investors and is not subject to all of the independence and disclosure standards applicable to debt research reports prepared for retail investors. This material does not constitute research.
Supply of private-label RMBS jumped dramatically this year and appears poised to take another pronounced jump higher in 2025. Growing supply appears poised to meet with strong demand, likely signaling tighter spreads ahead, particularly for shorter duration exposures that serve as out-of-index surrogates for short-dated corporates.
With roughly $135 billion in year-to-date issuance, supply of non-agency RMBS should roughly double last year’s volumes. Next year may be setting up to compete with the recent high-water mark of 2021, which saw upwards of $200 billion in gross issuance. Next year may draw a couple of key comparisons to 2021, namely the prospects for a smaller GSE footprint and steepening of the yield curve, both of which should be strong tailwinds for supply of private-label RMBS. In addition to policy and the curve, equity extraction will likely be a key driver of private-label supply into next year.
A look at sources of supply
A smaller GSE footprint likely pushes more non-owner-occupied and jumbo conforming loans to private-label channels as evidenced in 2021 when FHFA was stewarded by Trump appointment Mark Calabria. In 2021, agency eligible investor loans accounted for over $25 billion in PLS supply versus just $4 billion this year. Any targeted action by a new FHFA director to limit purchases of non-owner-occupied loans would likely translates to tens of billions in non-agency supply next year.
With our colleague Stephen Stanley calling for a total of five cuts over the remainder of this year and next, lower front end benchmark rates, if realized, should skew a growing amount of non-QM production towards securitization and away from insurance capital given the substantial reduction in cost-of-funds for sponsors as benchmark rates fall. A flat and often inverted yield curve over the past two years has created stiff competition from insurance capital for non-QM loans as evidenced in the material drawdown in securitization rates of these loans over the same horizon. According to Inside Mortgage Finance, securitization rates of non-QM whole loans have hovered around 50% most quarters in recent years, resulting in roughly $35 billion in issuance this year. Assuming roughly $100 billion in gross originations next year and roughly a two thirds securitization share could see non-QM issuance roughly double next year to upwards of $65 billion.
Short duration corporate surrogates appear poised to outperform
With most sectors of the investment grade market trading at 5-year tights, short duration structured products currently offer attractive out-of-index exposure for managers looking to add alpha and outperform corporate benchmarks. ABS looks likely to be the clear beneficiary of out-of-index flows given the soft bulleted nature of most ABS cash flows and little to no required analysis of embedded option cost, making the relative value framework versus short corporates fairly straight forward. Conversely, any analysis of private-label MBS exposures versus corporates will involve valuation of the convexity of the exposure both in the form of prepayment risk and call risk.
Looking at current non-QM ‘AAA’ pricing suggests that investors may already be viewing the asset class more so as a surrogate for corporates than MBS. ‘AAA’ spreads for top tier issuers currently sit at 115 bp, well inside nominal spreads on current coupon 30-year MBS which are just outside of 130 bp versus a duration neutral blend of 5- and 10-year Treasuries (Exhibit 1). Given substantially superior liquidity and arguably convexity in current coupon agency MBS, other factors are likely at play in driving ‘AAA’ non-QM spreads inside those of current coupon MBS.
Exhibit 1: NQM ‘AAA’ spreads inside of current coupon MBS
Differences in duration between the two instruments can certainly factor into the decision as the effective duration of non-QM ‘AAA’s is roughly half of that of current coupon MBS. However, embedded in that duration forecast for non-QM ‘AAA’s is an assumption of if or when the sponsor will call the transaction. Shorter duration ‘AAA’s are more likely to be viewed as surrogates for short corporates while longer duration, less callable non-QM seniors are more likely to be benchmarked against MBS and require more nominal spread compensation given the benchmark. This is evident when mapping the duration of non-QM ‘AAA’s against the basis between their spreads and current coupon MBS, where, as the duration of non-QM ‘AAA’s extended into the backup in rates, investors commanded a greater premium over the MBS benchmark (Exhibit 2).
Exhibit 2: Non-QM spreads tighten as duration shortens
While an upward sloping forward curve may suggest lower future collateral prices and diminished callability, this appears to be largely offset by projections of future front-end benchmark rates which are substantially lower than spots and likely create significant incentive for sponsors to call and re-lever these structures when they become callable. With the overwhelming majority of non-QM liabilities struck off the 2-year spot on the curve, the 3-year forward 2-year rate, at which point a new issue deal would be callable, provides valuable insight as to whether a deal may be called in the future. That rate currently sits at 3.71% roughly 50 bp below spot rates and potentially creating substantial incentive for non-QM sponsors to call newly minted transactions in the future.
Asset managers may view closed-end second lien, re-performing and residential transition loan transactions in the same vein based on callability, structure, collateral or some combination thereof. Investors weighing call probability should gravitate towards deals backed by closed-end second (CES) liens given the greater probability of calls being exercised in those transactions relative to non-QM deals. Increased likelihood of CES transactions being called is driven by the sizable differences in the price of loans backing CES deals versus those backing NQM trusts. The average price of collateral being contributed to non-QM trusts is roughly $102 to $103, meaning absent a sponsor hedging the call, collateral valuations can dip below the par call strike even without a major move upward in rates. By comparison, collateral backing CES deals generally ranges between $106 and $107, with the same par strike as NQM trusts. Given this, investors looking for short, soft bullet-like corporate surrogates may favor CES ‘AAA’ even over those of NQM exposures as they currently offer an additional 20 to 25 bp in nominal spread and substantially better prospects of being called.
Supply may weigh on prime spreads, investor collateral continues to offer better relative value
Investors looking for out-of-index exposure to an MBS benchmark may be subject to some near-term widening in prime private-label exposures, particularly if supply surprises to the upside as more loans that were previously delivered to the enterprises find their way to private-label securitization conduits. Based on current spread and subordination levels, the private-label market appears well positioned to absorb additional supply of agency eligible non-owner-occupied loans and that advantage will only become more pronounced if a new director of FHFA further increases LLPAs on these loans (Exhibit 3).
Exhibit 3: Breaking down agency and non-agency execution for investor loans
Out-of-index investors should skew allocations towards GSE-eligible loans as they may more closely track potential MBS tightening next year and, in the case of investor loans, may offer better convexity than other private-label exposures. Tracking performance of investor loans securitized in prime trusts shows marginal convexity differences between investor loans that are pooled versus those in private-label trusts and investors are substantially compensated for selling the relative liquidity associated with specified pools in most normalized credit and liquidity scenarios.