The Big Idea
Argentina | A confidence booster
Siobhan Morden | July 29, 2022
This document is intended for institutional investors and is not subject to all of the independence and disclosure standards applicable to debt research reports prepared for retail investors. This material does not constitute research.
Investors should look at Argentina through the lens of breakeven returns. The third turnover in economic leadership in a month is worrisome, but the market seems to take comfort from the strong political capital brought to the job by new “Super” Economy Minister Sergio Massa. Historically low bonds prices also appear increasingly attractive after the rally in other speculative grade issuers across emerging markets. Just getting coupon payments into early 2024 would allow investors to breakeven at current prices on some of Argentina’s debt. Short of a worst-case scenario, Argentina sovereigns look like good relative value.
Argentina’s plan for managing the economy remain the same. Argentina needs to manage the treasury funding and foreign exchange pressures with incremental measures and show progress towards fiscal consolidation and positive real interest rates. Successful treasury auctions and aggressive interest rate hikes have given the country some breathing room. However, it’s an uncertain month-to-month process of managing a moderate economic transition through acute imbalances in spending and revenues. There is no quick fix and no positive shock that can quickly turn things around. The new economic team under Minister Massa will have to stick to the plan of only gradual adjustment, limited by social pressures that discourage shock therapy. If Argentina can manage investor confidence, then each month should bring the country closer a stabilizing political transition in October 2023 (similar to October 2015). It would take extreme worst-case scenarios over the next 18 months for current prices around 20 on Eurobonds to make sense.
The latest cabinet reshuffle once again puts a spotlight on how the Fernandez administration plans to deliver on the International Monetary Fund economic program. There is not much margin for policy flexibility under the opposing objectives of adjusting the economy under an IMF program and managing the social pressures from inflationary shock. The market for now seems to see Minister Massa as a moderating influence on Kirchnerismo and likely to get better execution of a difficult IMF program. It will require a combination of political capital and technical expertise to deliver IMF program results.
The former Economy Minister Silvina Batakis had effectively managed the finances of the Province of Buenos Aires under the Scioli administration. The similar-style fiscal adjustment for the federal government would rely on capex cutbacks as well as the inflationary revenues, tariff hikes on income segmentation and efficiency savings among public entities. This probably remains the same recipe under Massa. The IMF would also still provide technical advice through the transition and require similar commitment on whoever leads the economic team. The burden remains the same. Argentina needs to deliver results on fiscal consolidation and positive real interest rates over the next few months. This is the only quasi-anchor to manage investor sentiment necessary for rolling over domestic debt and reducing foreign exchange stress. The latest cabinet reshuffle provides some near-term optimism, especially following the aggressive 600 bp hike of the central bank policy rate.
Steady muddling-through should keep rollover risk low on Argentina’s restructured debt payments. The low debt payments should remain a priority US dollar liability for the current Fernandez administration, which restructured the bonds with backloaded payments. The coupon payments on select bonds, at near four points for the ARGENT’38 and ARGENT’41, is actually meaningful on a breakeven return analysis with bonds trading in the mid-20s. The current bond prices imply worst case scenarios of 20 on recovery value compared to the 40 net present value in 2020 and 32 net present value in 2005. These levels would be difficult to rationalize under a base-case view of a moderate policy transition. Moderate policy transition relies on a few core assumptions:
- Broader public awareness on the need of a fiscal anchor
- Limits on funding from underdeveloped local markets, restricted access to external markets and inflationary backlash of excessive deficit monetization
The bottom line is that a rational IMF program from a center-left administration shows a mature societal and political shift towards policy moderation. This should not only imply reasonable exit yields (say near 15%) on a debt restructuring but also equitable burden sharing of liquidity relief and fiscal adjustment (higher trend primary surplus). There is still potential for near-term mark-to-market risk on the execution risk of a difficult IMF program; however, a medium-term investment horizon still suggests positive optionality from current low bond prices.
Siobhan Morden
Santander Investment Securities
1 (212) 692-2539
siobhan.morden@santander.us
U.S. Fixed Income Trading Commentary Disclaimer
This commentary has been prepared by the U.S. fixed income trading desk of Santander Investment Securities Inc. (together with its affiliates, “Santander”) for its institutional investor clients only, and may under no circumstances be redistributed beyond the recipient in whole or in part. The recipient is an “institutional account” as defined in FINRA Rule 4512(c) that (i) is capable of evaluating investment risks independently, both in general and with regard to particular transactions and investment strategies and (ii) will exercise independent judgment in evaluating any potential investments and any recommendations of any broker-dealers. For the avoidance of doubt, this commentary is not suitable for or intended for retail investors.
This commentary has not been produced or reviewed by, and does not otherwise reflect the views or input of, the Research Department of Santander (“Santander Research”). This commentary may conflict with the views of Santander Research, is not subject to all of the independence and disclosure standards applicable to research reports prepared for retail investors and is not independent from the interests of Santander. Santander may have positions (long or short) in, effect transactions in or make markets in the subject securities (or related derivatives) mentioned in this commentary, and such positions or trading may be inconsistent with this commentary. However, Santander is under no obligation to make a market in or otherwise provide liquidity in any security discussed herein. This material may have been previously communicated to Santander’s trading desk. Santander may have in the past or may in the future provide investment banking services (including underwriting activity and loans) or other services for the companies mentioned in this commentary.
This commentary has been provided for informational purposes only and is not a recommendation, offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security or related instrument. This communication is intended to be short term and brief in nature, and therefore does not provide a full analysis of any issuer or security or a sufficient basis upon which to base an investment decision. The individual circumstances of the recipient’s investment objectives and needs have not been considered in this commentary, and nothing in this commentary constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice or a representation that any investment strategy or service is suitable or appropriate to the recipient’s individual circumstances. Information contained herein has been compiled from sources believed to be reliable, but no representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to its accuracy or completeness. The recipient should not rely on this commentary for any investment decision or other action, and Santander expressly disclaims any liability for any losses arising from any reliance on or otherwise related to this commentary. This commentary reflects the personal views of the individual sender of such commentary, and no part of his or her individual compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to its content. This commentary is provided as of the date and time thereof, and Santander does not undertake any responsibility to update or revise any of the information contained herein, which may change without notice. Past performance is not indicative of future results.
Fixed income securities, including those described herein, are subject to many risks, including, but not limited to, interest rate risk, the credit risk of the issuer, inflation risk, liquidity risk and risk of a downgrade by rating agencies. Emerging markets investments are additionally subject to political, economic, legal, regulatory, market, settlement, execution, currency and other risks. Fixed income, and specifically emerging markets, investments are not suitable for all investors.
Santander Investment Securities Inc. is an SEC registered broker-dealer, FINRA member and SIPC member. Santander Investment Securities Inc. is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Santander Holdings USA Inc., which is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Banco Santander, S.A